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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Art is a creative phenomenon which changes constantly, not just insofar as it is being created 
continually, but also in the very meaning of ‘art.’ Finding a suitable definition of art is no easy task 
and it has been the subject of much inquiry throughout artistic expression. This paper suggests a 
crucial distinction between ‘art forms’ and ‘forms of art’ is necessary in order to argue that the 
future of art will bring a new aesthetic in which these properties become recognized as art and as 
such there will be an aesthetic of everyday life. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Defining art is a difficult task; it is one which many theorists, artists, and critics have tackled, trying to 
decide upon the best approach to understanding what we mean by art. It is a question still being asked 
in contemporary literature (Crowther, 2007; Currie, 2010; Clowney, 2011). Yet it is only through coming 
to a greater understanding of what art is, that we can then attempt to determine what the future of art 
will have in store. Should we consider art only that which we find aesthetically pleasurable? In that case, 
will the future of art bring additional ways of art being made aesthetic? The question of the future of art 
is directly related to what art is; therefore, it is necessary to first consider a way to understand art, such 
that we may understand what the future of art may bring.In this paper, I will outline the major positions 
on the meaning of art in order to draw out a commonality among the many theories. In doing so, I will 
argue that what we call art is simply a representation of the art forms of which they are a part.  
 
David E. W. Fenner asked “why define ‘art’?” instead of just considering it as something subjective and 
which takes a stance as art merely because one labels it as such (Fenner, 1994). It is something that has 
been attempted many times by many people. There still is no consensus on what makes art, in fact, art. 
Nevertheless, there is a great interest in finding a workable definition of art, since most will agree when 
something is not, and should not be considered, art. This is because art is meant to be appreciated, 
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even in cases when it is disturbing or controversial. Betty Seabolt suggests that the appreciation of art 
comes down to “understanding and enjoying art” (Seabolt, 2001). Art is always to be appreciated and 
the best way for it to be so, is to have a definition of art which enables an appreciation of art.  
 
Still, more recently, Dominic Lopes suggests that no theory of defining art is necessary. He claims we 
“need a theory of art only if it is settled by a theory of each art form whether a work belongs to the art 
form and yet it is not settled whether the work is art”, in which case no theory is needed since by 
belonging to an art form, the work has already been considered art (Lopes, 2008). I am mostly in 
agreement with this sentiment, therefore, not proposing here to attempt a new definition of art itself. 
Instead, I propose to reconsider how we think of art, in particular ‘art forms,’ and establish a new 
distinction between “art forms” and “forms of art.” The latter of these corresponds to that which we 
typically refer to as art, such as painting, singing, etc. The former corresponds to the form out of which 
these “forms of art” take shape, such as movement, speech, etc. This paper concerns itself more with 
this rethinking of “art forms” and “forms of art”and what that means for the future of art rather than 
how this alters the very definition of art. In this way, the paper addresses a concern that is only briefly, 
if at all, discussed in the typical contemporary literature, most of which focuses on the future of art 
education (Jagodzinski, 2005; Piene and Russett, 2008; Carrier, 2011) or on particular art styles like 
feminist art (Wilson, 2008). 
 
1.1 Methodology 
 
I approach this topic from a qualitative and historical perspective, analyzing various accounts of art and 
definitions of art, in an attempt to find similarities among the many approaches. Drawing out the 
commonalities, that is, by finding what each theory proposes in unison, the distinction between “art 
forms” and “forms of art” becomes grounded. I believe this commonality is the perceiving of art as 
representation in some capacity or another. While at times it may appear that this paper is normative, 
suggesting how art oughtto be considered, it is entirely meant to be descriptive in nature, offering only 
how art really is or has been defined, and using this historical and qualitative analysis to explore the 
future of art based on these descriptive claims. 
 
2. Defining art 
 
There are several major positions on the best way to define art. In his bookThe Philosophy of Art, 
Theodore Gracyknames these as functionalist, expressionist, institutional, and cluster definitions, the 
last of which is simply a mixture of the others (Gracyk, 2012). Functionalist definitions centers on the 
purpose, or the specific task that art fulfills. That is to say, we can term something art, only if it fulfills or 
performs a specific function, or possesses certain qualities. We can find potential problems already, as 
many have, with the functionalist approach to definitions of art. For example, to say art does “x,” or art 
possesses “x,” there immediately exists the possibility of excluding certain works of art which do not fit 
such narrow categories. On the reverse, if you make the category broad enough, perhaps the definition 
becomes too inclusive. We therefore find that any definition of art requires more than a focus on the 
particularities of art. 
 
Expressionist definitions, a version of functionalist definitions, of art attempt to address the problem of 
finding the “goldilock’s zone” between inclusivity and exclusivity by switching the focus to what the 
work expresses, or even trickier, what it is intended to express.  We say then, “x” is art if it expresses a 
value which art is meant to, or typically does, express. First, intention is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine, especially for works whose authors do not leave any mark from which we can determine 
the artists intention. Further, intention becomes more difficult when the author had no intention 
whatsoever for the piece to be expressive. Thus, a work of art may not express anything other than the 
subjective feelings it arises in its audience, which cannot determine its being or not being a work of art. 
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Expressionist definitions of art are more useful for determining the quality of art, rather than what can 
be called art.  Consider, for example, the statement “x” is bad art because it does not express “y,” or it 
does so inadequately. The failure to express, or express adequately, can be a factor for judging the 
quality of art, though it rests on a semi-functionalist definition (one must be willing to say that the 
expression of “y” determines what is art – a rather functionalist way of defining art – and, “x” failing to 
do so adequately makes it bad art). 
 
Institutional definitions of art stress factors outside of the work itself. A good example of this is the 
Medicine Cabinets by Damien Hirst. This is considered art, however my medicine cabinet is not; how is it 
that two similar or identical objects can be considered differently regarding their status as art? This can 
only be the case if there is an additional “non-manifest” feature of the one. “Perhaps Duchamp’s 
Fountain was a sculpture…because he had an opportunity for exploiting institutional settings – an art 
exhibition and an avant garde art magazine – that gave it that status” (Gracyk, 2012, p. 111). This is the 
focus of institutional definitions which assert that this non-manifest feature is the determining factor of 
art. If one is to claim a piece as a work of art, it is necessary to be acquainted with the social conditions 
surrounding that piece. For example, George Dickie in Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, 
argues that naming a work of art ‘art’ assumes we acknowledge and understand the ideas of public and 
art-world (Dickie, 1974).2 
 
Thus, by understanding, and only through understanding, that Hirst’s Medicine Cabinet is at an art 
gallery, and is presented in a particular way, can we determine that his is a work of art and my cabinet is 
not. The problem with such definitions of art is that they assert nothing about the actual work, and are 
only concerned with whether or not it is presented at the right time, in the right place, using the right 
way, and to the right audience. 
 
Next, Gracyk discusses historical definitions, which suggest that art is only art in reference to particular 
qualities of past art. Jerrold Levinson defines art saying that “it is a thing (item, object, entity) that has 
been seriously intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e., regard in any way preexisting art-works are or 
were correctly regarded” (Levinson, 1989). To use again, Hirst’s cabinet as an example, it is art because 
he owned the property rights to the cabinet, and submitted it to an art gallery to be recognized for 
possessing qualities that other works of art, that have been regarded as art, also possessed. This type 
of definition brings with it many issues. Gracyk mentions two of these issue that are worth further 
discussion. 
 
First, it seems to be an unnecessary condition that artists own the piece or the product that they 
create. This does not really add much to art, and much art in the past has been commissioned whereby 
the artist owns nothing. Second, there is a type of regress problem involved. Where does the first piece 
of art draw its references from? In other words, the very first art cannot be intended to reflect qualities 
that have been regarded as art in the past. Gracyk makes notice of this problem and asks “when did the 
history of art begin?” Following historical definitions, there does not seem to be a solid response to 
either of these problems. 
 
3. Aesthetic definitions in history 
 
Since we find major flaws in each of the major methods of defining art, how then are we left to do so? 
We must consider the underlying problem with these approaches, before we may appropriately 
understand art. Some of the first theories regarding art focus on the ability art has to represent the 
world around us. Most of the ancient philosophers considered the function of art to bemimesis, that art 
is merely an imitation of appearances. 
 
                                                          
2 “A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status 
of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld).”  
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In theRepublic, Plato divides knowledge of things into three classes or categories: forms, objects, and 
imitations. The paintings we create, the poems we write, and the stories we tell, are all merely limited 
imitations of actual things, and insofar as they are limited, the arts are not as meaningful, or as 
important as the actual, true objects and forms. “All such things seem to maim the thought of those 
who hear them and do not as a remedy have the knowledge of how they really are” (Plato, 1968, 595a). 
In this way, many arts can be harmful, as they can trick us into identifying something as accurate, 
despite its being only an imitation; art can rely to us false knowledge of the things depicted. 
 
Aristotle also thought that art was aimed at imitating, or mimesis. His approach was much less negative 
than was Plato’s own account. For Aristotle, the imitation of objects was not providing us with false 
knowledge but is rather useful.3 In fact, we learn through imitation, which eventually leads to 
habituation, an important aspect in developing virtue. Thus, imitation of nature or of objects can teach 
us and should be applauded not dispelled. Indeed, it is natural that we take a form of pleasure from the 
learning we do through mimesis, as Aristotle notes in his Poetics(Aristotle, 1997, 1184b). 
 
Later, in his Critique of Judgement, Kant discusses art in terms of the aesthetic judgements which we 
make. Specifically, Kantsuggests that ‘pure’ aesthetic judgements are disinterested, or that they do not 
arise out of a desire for the object which is the subject of our judgment (Kant, 1987). This pure, or free, 
beauty, is less common and applies only to art that is abstract, or that does not aim to depict reality, 
such as instrumental music. 
 
More common are judgments of adherent beauty, as Kant terms it, when considering works of art. 
Since the natural is the most free, or pure, form of beauty, Kant suggests that the fine arts are to 
appear as natural as possible. To do so, an artist relies on their intuition, or what Kant calls “genius.” 
“Genius,” refers to a specific ability of an artist, to create the beautiful. This is why what an artist 
creates tends to be aesthetically pleasing, according to Kant (Kant, 1987). This, however, becomes 
problematic in the post-conceptual era, where many works of art are not aesthetically pleasing, nor are 
they judged beautiful. 
 
Following from Kant, Hegel critiques previous accounts of what art is, prior to asserting his own 
perspective. The first thought Hegel questions is the notion that art’s purpose is mimesis; or rather to 
copy or imitate nature. Hegel finds this notion quite absurd and writes that this is “A superfluous 
labour, seeing that the things which pictures, theatrical representations, etc., imitate and represent – 
animals, natural scenes, incidents of human life – are before us already…we may regard this 
superfluous labour as a presumptuous sport which comes far short of nature” (Hegel, 1993). In other 
words, why would anyone recreate what is already there in reality, especially when what they create is 
incomparable to the real thing existing in nature? He asserts that these recreations only show “one-
sided depictions” and are not complete in form. Kant would readily agree with this perspective. 
 
Another mode of thought Hegel considers is that art is used to teach, as Aristotle suggests, and more 
specifically to teach morals. This too for Hegel does not seem to make much sense since this suggestion 
calls into question why teaching requires art and why morals and other lessons cannot just be merely 
taught. Hegel argues that “if the purpose of art is limited to this didactic utility, then its other aspect, 
that of pleasure, entertainment, and delight, is pronounced to be in itself unessential” (Hegel, 1993). 
 
Kosuth begins by asserting that art has a language, and that this language is the various forms of art, 
from which art takes shape. He writes, “If we continue our analogy of the forms art takes as being art’s 
language one can realize then that a work of art is a kind of proposition presented within the context of 
art as a comment on art” (Osborne, 2002). This suggests the conclusion that art must be in some way 
attempting to extend the definition of what it means to be art. Art forming as the language of art is a 
concept which will provide for a way to understand what art is. Another notion which Kosuth asserts is 
that art should not and indeed does not have a truthness or a falseness to it. Going from this he states: 
                                                          
3 It is useful to note that Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of forms and so the resistance to false knowledge is not necessary. 
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The unreality of realistic art is due to its framing as an art proposition in synthetic terms: one is 
always tempted to verify the proposition empirically. Realism’s synthetic state does not bring 
one to a circular swing back into a dialogue with the larger framework of questions about the 
nature of art, but rather one is flung out of art’s orbit into the infinite space of the human 
condition (Osborne, 2002). 
 
Kosuth is referencing the tautology of the analytic terms of art’s proposition. Here, he is suggesting 
that art, if taken for what it is, explains no fact and tells neither truth nor lie. What does this tell to us 
about art? 
 
The overall argument presented here is that art is the artist’s intention to show what can be considered 
to be art. Kosuth writes, “what is important in art is what one brings to it, not one’s adaptation of what 
was previously existing,” which is extremely important to our understanding this aspect of his aesthetic 
theory. He continues on, in the same fashion, to make a bold statement in reference to Pollack that 
“What is even less important to art is Pollack’s notions of self-expression because those kinds of 
subjective meanings are useless to anyone other than those involved with him personally” (Osborne, 
2002). Here we have two very important quotes directly addressing the question of what makes good 
art, or how does one incorporate this proposition appropriately into their art. 
 
The first of these statements from Kosuth explains further that art not only needs to push the 
boundaries of the definition of art, but it must continuously bring forward a new thought to this 
definition. If one is merely continuing down the trend of new definitions and not bringing a new 
definition, Kosuth would not see this as good art. The second statement here explains to us that art 
does not need to be, and truly should not be, a sort of expression of the self which draws away from 
the art’s context. Rather it seems, this new definition of art being created should remain within the 
context of art. 
 
Walter Benjamin makes the claim that what art ends up doing, is not merely representing the current 
stage of society, but rather prepares and leads us towards a progression of society. Benjamin suggests 
this idea that art is not only to represent the current social situations and conditions, but to also 
prepare for and bring about new societal changes. One of the first statements he makes to suggest this 
is that  
One of the foremost tasks of art has always been the creation of a demand which could be fully 
satisfied only later.The history of every art form shows critical epochs in which a certain art form 
aspires to effects, which could be fully obtained only with a changed technical standard, that is to 
say, in a new art form (Benjamin, 1935). 
 
In other words, Benjamin is suggesting that, one of biggest concerns of art is to progress itself, since it 
sought to do something which could only be done with the advent of new ways of production. This is 
very similar to what Kosuth was suggesting in that both feel that art is attempting to extend its 
boundaries and progress art itself. 
 
Benjamin continues on in his work to talk about what he calls distraction. What he means by this is that 
we, as a people, have become distracted from life. He uses film as an example of causing distraction, 
suggesting that film has a tendency to draw people into it, where they become not only an audience 
but also almost half-experience the film. In regards to this idea Benjamin suggests: 
art will tackle the most difficult and most important ones where it is able to mobilize the masses. 
Today it does so in the film. Reception in a state of distraction, which is increasing noticeably in 
all fields of art and is symptomatic of profound changes in apperception, finds in the film its true 
means of exercise. The film with its shock effect meets this mode of reception halfway. The film 
makes the cult value recede into the background not only by putting the public in the position 
of the critic, but also by the fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The 
public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one (Benjamin, 1935). 
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Benjamin suggests, this notion of distraction, will make art cause societal shifts; mobilizing the masses 
in such a way that society changes and progresses. This is the first major point that Benjamin suggests 
in this passage. This social change Benjamin feels art brings about is started from this idea of 
distraction. As this passage points out, the audience of film (which brings this notion of distraction), is 
“absent-minded,” they are drawn into the film and experience it rather than pay close attention to 
detail.  But where does this lead society? Benjamin suggests that if aesthetics will be drawn into the 
political world it will have a terrible result. Humanity’s “self-alienation has reached such a degree that it 
can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order,” Benjamin writes 
(Benjamin, 1935). Art will depict catastrophes, yet because it is aesthetically pleasing, these 
catastrophes will become dulled out. 
 
4. The commonality of definitions 
 
Here we have discussed several ways in which art can be, and has been defined by major philosophers 
in aesthetic theory. So then, how do we best define art? Is there not something common to each of 
these methods and means of defining art? Indeed if there were, then we might use that as the 
grounding for understanding where the future of art might lead. Reconsidering the accounts outlined 
above, all of them refer to art as a form of representation in some manner, only organized differently. 
What I am suggesting will become more evident as we examine these theories defining art in terms of 
representation. 
 
In both the accounts of Plato and Aristotle, art is mimesis, or imitation. There is obviously a connection 
with representation in such accounts, as imitation is representation itself. For Plato, art is representing 
what he calls “forms.” In Aristotle, art is representing objects in nature, or reality. This is why in his 
understanding, art can be used to teach since there is nothing that is hidden in art, such as the forms 
would be in Plato’s theory. 
 
In Kant’s theory as well, the impact of viewing art as a form of representation is also clear. For Kant 
there are two meanings of aesthetic: an original meaning and an extended meaning of the term. In his 
Critique of Pure Reason, the transcendental analytic refers to the pure forms of intuition from which we 
can sense the world around us, namely space and time. This, Peter Osborne suggests, is what Kant 
means by the “original use” of aesthetic, whereas aesthetic judgements of taste are the “extended 
use” (Osborne, 2013). 
 
According to Kant, only the sensible element is purely aesthetic; the judgements of taste are flawed. 
Osborne writes that the error of these judgments for Kant, is due to a “failed hope” of ‘“bringing the 
critical estimation of the beautifulunder principles of reason, and elevating its rules to a science”; that 
is, from the aspiration to a rationaldoctrine of the beautiful, an “aesthetic”, in a scientific disciplinary 
sense’” (Osborne, 2013). Regardless, it is evident that both uses are forms of representation. The 
original use represents the sensible elements, whereas the extended meaning represents taste, or 
what is judged to be tasteful. Thus, we see how this line of thinking of art has continued even in Kant. 
 
How does Hegel’s theory of art form out of an understanding of art as representation? Very simply, 
Hegel asserts that art shows the current stage of Geist in history. What this means is that art shows us a 
current cultural status. This thought places the idea as the most important aspect of a work of art. 
However, since art is meant to show the spirit of the times, there is no good or bad forms or works of 
art, only those which represent the stage of Geist more accurately. Hegel explains this notion within its 
historical context by separating art into three forms: symbolic, classical, and romantic. 
 
In the symbolic form of art, which was used during humanity’s early history (pre-ancient Greeks), Hegel 
states that this was “a mere search after plastic portrayal [rather] than a capacity of genuine 
representation. The idea has not yet found the true form even within itself, and therefore continues to 
be merely the struggle and aspiration thereafter” (Hegel, 1993). So in this stage, art is created not to 
strictly represent something, but to symbolize something, a form of representation. An example of this 
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style of art are the terracotta figurines by which the creator would attempt to symbolize something, 
such as fertility through making a very large breasted woman. Although the idea is being represented 
Hegel suggests that this representation is crude and that the idea is only abstractly represented. 
 
After the stage of symbolic art, the idea becomes better represented, in the classical art stage. This 
phase of art, Hegel claims, “is the free and adequate embodiment of the idea in the shape that, 
according to its conception, is peculiarly appropriate to the idea itself. With it, therefore, the idea is 
capable of entering into free and complete accord” (Hegel, 1993). It is in this stage, Hegel is suggesting, 
that the complete form of the idea is in unity with the design of the art. The way classical art is most 
known for doing this is personification, or as Hegel calls it, the human form. This human form of art, 
puts the idea into art without leaving it completely abstract, or not as absolute and eternal, as Hegel 
says. 
 
Finally, art reaches its third stage; that which Hegel refers to as the romantic stage of artistic 
representation. Art in this phase breaks down the unity that the classical phase had established. This 
stage of art is free from the boundaries of immediate existence, and transcends its own being, leading 
Hegel to claim, “in this third stage the object (of art) is free, concrete intellectual being, which has the 
function of revealing itself as spiritual existence for the inward world of spirit” (Hegel, 1993). Because 
this form of art finds itself as the inner world, it must also be a representation of the inner feelings.4 
 
As one can see through Hegel’s examples of the stages of art, each work of art within these phases is a 
way of representing what was important to a particular culture in a particular time, or as Hegel terms it, 
Geist. So, for the symbolic art phase, what was important were characteristics such as fertility, strength, 
courage, and other such traits that were seen as admirable or praiseworthy. This idea that art shows 
what people in that era deem to be important will prove to be important when thinking about where 
the future of art will lead. 
 
Continuing on, how does Kosuth’s theory relate to art as representation? Kosuth’s theory on art is really 
based in thinking of art as a form of representation. More specifically, representation of what the 
definition of art is, and even more so the representation of the artist’s intentions behind the work of 
art. As Kosuth had stated, art’s proposition comes from the artist’s intention. This shows that art is the 
representation of these artist’s ideas of the definitions of what art is and of what can be considered to 
be art. 
 
Kosuth has an additional claim to make about art as representation as well. He writes, “In this period of 
man, after philosophy and religion, art may possibly be one endeavor that fulfills what another age 
might have called man’s spiritual needs…Art’s only claim is for art. Art is the definition of art” 
(Osborne, 2002). Interesting here is the notion that art is representation of the spiritual needs of man. 
In other words, art is the representation of something which adheres to that in man which exists 
outside of the mundane world. 
 
Both Kosuth’s and Hegel’s theories have something which they represent. They, together, show art as a 
way of progressing. For Hegel, art is about representing the current stage of Geist, or culture, whereas 
in Kosuth’s theory we see that art is constantly attempting to expand its own boundaries. This suggests 
that as art continuously pushes its boundaries into new forms of representation, the current 
importance of the art is also changing. Therefore, we find that these two theories lead to a notion that 
art is a means of progression as well as a representation of that progression. 
 
Just as with Kosuth and Hegel, Benjamin’s theory on art also shows art as a form of representation. For 
Benjamin this is a representation of the current social conditions as well as starting society on a 
                                                          
4 Friedrich Shiller, “Kallias, or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Körner” in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. 
J.M Bernstein. Schiller has a theory of beauty which focuses on inner feelings which the art arises in the viewer. Particularly the 
beautiful is that in which we can recognize our own freedom.  
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progression towards the future. But what is this future? Is this future really one of war and alienation? 
While Benjamin’s theory on the future has its value, there are reasons to think, going back to Hegel and 
Kosuth as well, that the future of art will not be one such as Benjamin suggests, but rather the 
complete opposite. 
 
5. Art and representation 
 
In order to fully understand the future of art, of we must first think about what art is, something which 
each of the theorists discuss. With Kosuth suggesting art is always attempting to push its own 
definition, Hegel claiming art shows the current stage of history’s progression, and Benjamin asserting 
that art reveals to us our current social conditions as well as prepares us for social change, it seems all 
but certain that art is rooted in representation of some sort. But what is art really representing? Is it the 
current stage of cultural importance, or the social conditions, or what art is, or does art instead 
represent art itself? What we mean by this last thought is not the same as Kosuth was suggesting. Art 
as representing art is a notion that Art forms, not forms of art, such as painting, photography, et cetera, 
are merely used to represent that which is art and as such, has nothing to do with the expansion of art. 
 
Each of these theorists have defined art in a way in which it is used to represent something. However, 
each of them disagree as to what art is meant to represent. Not everyone would agree that art is aimed 
at representation, however. Gracyknotes, when discussing institutional definitions of art, that 
Duchamp’s Fountain is art, regardless of anything that it does or is meant to represent (Gracyk, 2012). 
Instead, the piece gains status of art simply because it was placed in a particular environment. Most 
arguments against the suggestion that art is a means of representation follow this pattern. But this 
argument does not really hold up to scrutiny. 
 
First, even if some art is only art insofar as it is in a particular environment, this is certainly not true of all 
art. If it were, then the unfinished painting is not art, as it is not yet in an art gallery or has not been 
made available for public viewing, etc. In short, only finished art, with an audience, can be called art, 
according to this objection. The fault in this argument is that it is not universal enough to contain all 
pieces of art.  
 
Furthermore, would we truly be satisfied to understand that Duchamp had no reason behind such a 
piece? That is, would we feel just as appreciative of such a piece, should we know that there was 
nothing which it was meant to represent? Let us imagine such a scenario. 
 
Imagine Duchamp shows you a desk with a paintbrush on it. Would you think it a piece of art? Probably 
not. Imagine next, go to an art gallery and see Duchamp’s desk with a paintbrush on it as an exhibit. Is it 
art? Instantly one can assert that it is in fact a piece of art. Is this change due to the environment only? 
Or, is it instead due to the arousal of curiosity the piece arises within you over what it is meant to 
represent? Finally, imagine Duchamp shows you a new piece he is working on to represent the artistic 
process. When he reveals the piece, it is a desk with a paintbrush on it. Is it still art? Most likely you 
would say that it is.  
 
Thus, it is not the environment that makes art what it is, but rather it is the fact that it is 
representational. This does not mean all art is representational art or that it is always clear what is 
being represented. Abstract, and nonrepresentational art can also be forms of representation, even if it 
is not straight-forward. 
 
If then, we are to assert that all art shares in common, being a form of representation then it should be 
easy to establish exactly what art is representing.What then are we to decide art is representing? Is it 
representing reality or nature? Certainly this cannot be the only aim of representation as we said not all 
art is representational art. Perhaps it is best to first consider the meaning of art itself, in order to 
determine what art aims at representing, 
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6. The meaning of art 
 
Art itself, the Greek words techne5 andpoesis,6 actually refer not only to the fine arts but rather to a 
possession of a set of skills, the ability one has to create, and the creation itself. These crafts are 
distinguished by the various ends at which they aim and are associated with special kinds of knowledge. 
Therefore art is made up of much more broad categories, such as the art of movement or the art of 
speech. Here then, a distinction must be made. What we now consider art – painting, music, dancing 
etc. – are not arts in themselves, but are forms of art. Why is this so? as we have just eluded to, art itself 
is a much more broad category containing both these forms of art, or fine arts, as well as more general 
forms of art, such as chair-making, which we may term crafts. So then, what is art representing? 
 
If we are to come to an understanding of what art itself is, we need to determine the category under 
which may be placed the two distinct forms of art, either fine arts or crafts. This is not to say that the 
two must be subdivided from the same art form, but only that the art forms must be categories such 
that both of these various forms of art may be both understood as subcategories of art in general. If we 
should take art to be categories such as these various forms of art, like painting, music, and so forth, 
then we exclude the crafts such as shoe-making, to use an Aristotlean-like example, as we have 
confirmed previously, for it is certain that shoe-making does not fit into any of these forms of art, nor of 
any conceivable form of art. Instead if we are to think of an art form such as ‘knowledge,’ then we 
would most certainly concede that shoe-making belongs as a form of the art of that category. 
 
Thus, we may suggest that art is amalgamation of the general categories called art forms under which 
we may include both forms of art, fine arts and crafts. As such, falling in line with the advice of John 
Cage7, walking or talking in general are both representations of art forms: namely, the art of motion 
and the art of speech and language. One theorist who suggested a similar approach to understanding 
art, Clive Bell, wrote that “To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing but a sense of 
form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space” (Bell, 1961). Thus, the aesthetical 
element in a work is simply the color, shape, size, etc. 
 
However, these art forms, as we termed them are as of yet not aesthetically pleasing. Thus, in order 
that there will be a factor which makes people appreciate such things more, there needs to be a more 
aesthetical way to represent these art forms through a form of art; in other words, so that these art 
forms can become fully appreciated, various forms of art, or the fine arts, are used in order to represent 
these art forms in a more aesthetical way. For that reason, the art of movement is now represented 
with forms of art such as dance, while the art of speech is represented by means of singing. These 
forms of art are simply more aesthetically pleasing in the current era. However, this is where the history 
of art leads and where the future of art rests. 
 
7. The future of art and concluding remarks 
 
As artists who utilize these various art forms continue to push the boundaries of how to best represent 
various forms of art, these representations will become, slowly, more like everyday occurrences, unlike 
the assertion of Guy Debord8, in terms of both the work of art and how the receptor of the art 
experiences it. For example, the before-mentioned exhibits of contemporary art that put on display 
                                                          
5 The Greek term for ‘craft’ or ‘art’ refers mostly to a ‘craftsmanship’ or an ability within a person to create. 
6 The Greek for ‘to make’ and is commonly used to mean ‘art’ as well. Specifically it refers to the actual creation of a thing, or 
the transformation of one thing becoming another. 
7 John Cage, “26 Statements re. Duchamp” in Conceptual Art ed. Peter Osborne, 195. Cage writes that, “We must nowadays 
nevertheless at least be able to look through what’s beyond – as though we were in it looking out.” Thus, we are to get behind 
the beyond, to experience the world of art not just as viewer, but as a participant.  
8 Guy Debord “Détournement as Negation and Prelude” in Situationalist International Anthology, ed. by Ken Knabb, 55-56. 
Debord suggests, “At this point in the world’s development all forms of expression are losing grip on all reality and being 
reduced to self-parody.” 
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pharmaceuticals in medicine cabinets, thereby, taking from the distinction we have now established, 
representing the art of knowledge in a very similar way that shoe making is also of this kind.  
 
As time progresses, more and more focus will be placed on the objects themselves such as in this 
display. IPods and other such devices will be considered art, perhaps they will be taken apart to show 
the complexity of the design, still representing the art of knowledge, only expanding how the art form 
is used. Film will give way to a more “hands-on” experience, perhaps something along the lines of 
virtual reality9, as technology develops. 
 
Over time, this development will then lead to a stronger focus on the experiences of everyday life: 
walking, talking, colors, shapes, and sounds. As these are more directly related to, or are in themselves 
Art forms and will become more evidently aesthetical in and of themselves, no longer requiring indirect 
representation from various forms of art in order to be appreciated as Art, as the form of art will have 
its own aesthetical value. Exempli gratia, one will no longer need music to find the aesthetical value in 
the art of sound as the leaves blowing in the wind will thus become its own music.10 
 
This is not to suggest music will become obsolete. On the contrary, music will remain crucial to life, but 
that which is considered music will change into the art form itself, rather than being represented 
through a form of art such as a fine art or a craft. The end of this transformation process leads to a 
greater appreciation of life, since one is recognizing the aesthetical value, or beauty, of life itself; id est 
this act of regarding the sound of leaves, or other everyday noises, as music, and so on, will also lead to 
an overall change in attitude towards life, a more, aesthetical way of life. 
 
Taking these notions of the future of art and by looking at what constitutes art, it was concluded that 
art is much broader than mere fine arts or crafts. Then, through examining this distinction it was 
concluded that the future of art will place an emphasis on the art forms themselves, rather than the art 
forms requiring representation through forms of art in order that they become aesthetically 
pleasurable; that is to say we suggested an aesthetical shift.  
 
This shift in aesthetical value will eventually lead to the understanding of life as being aesthetical in and 
of itself, without the need for aesthetic fillers, and thereby eliminating controlled cultural consumption 
which Benjamin H.D. Buchloh suggests art concerns itself with during the late sixties.11 Through this 
analysis of art and its future, it was evident that the future of art can put forth, not the viewing of 
aesthetical desolation, but rather a greater appreciation for the beauty that is life. 
 
This proposition leaves open many future possibilities, however it suggests a future of art in which art is 
no longer viewed as art, but rather that entities in the world can be considered aesthetical. To put it 
simply, this brings to the forefront the discussion of the distinction between art and the aesthetic, with 
an emphasis on the latter as a means of facilitating different, and improved possibilities of human 
futures. Moving forward, research devoted to these new human futures ought to include the insight 
that the aesthetic of everyday life offers. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 The idea here is that movie-goers may ‘experience’ the movie in a more direct way than current means offer. For example, 
the viewer being placed into a character in the film and enjoying the film from a character’s specific point of view. 
10 Herbert Marcuse, AnEssay on Liberation, 27. Marcuse writes, “the aesthetic dimension can serve as a sort of gauge for a free 
society. A universe of human relationships no longer mediated by the market, no longer based on competitive exploitation or 
terror, demands a sensitivity freed from the rep ressive satisfactions of the unfree societies; a sensitivity receptive to forms 
and modes of reality which thus far have been projected only by the aesthetic imagination,” a similar perspective to the one 
proposed. 
11 Refer to Benjamin H.D. Buchloh’s Conceptual Art 1962-69: From the Aesthetics of Administration to the Critique of Institutions, 
“These institutions, which determine the conditions of cultural consumption, are the very ones in which artistic production is 
transformed into a tool of ideological control and cultural legitimation” (p. 143). 
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